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Introduction
Ideas for economic cooperation have been regularly advanced throughout
ASEAN's history, but none of these proposals achieved any results. The promise of
higher quality, lower cost products never outweighed the political pain that was
caused by industries that would be hurt by trade liberalization. It was only because of
the substantial threat posed by the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the
European Community (EC) that the impetus for ASEAN to proceed with regional
liberalization finally became strong enough. On 28 January, 1992 the leaders of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a treaty creating the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA aggregates the economies of Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, which combined represent more than 330
million people and a GNP of over $300 billion. AFTA aims to reduce tariffs to between
and 5% over the next fifteen years on all products currently traded in the region, with
the exceptions of unprocessed agricultural goods and services. In total, the products
included in the agreement account for 87% of ASEAN's total trade.
Tariffs will be reduced according to the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) agreement. Beginning on January 1, 1993, tariffs on most CEPT products will
be reduced to a maximum of 20% over the next five to eight years. After tariffs have
been reduced to 20% or lower, over the next seven years they will be further reduced to
0-5% by the year 2008. In addition, fifteen sectors of products were placed on an
accelerated schedule of tariff reduction under the CEPT. 1 Tariffs on these products will
be reduced below 5% within seven years if rates are presently less than 20%, and
within 10 years if tariffs are currently above 20%. Other quantitative restrictions, such
as quotas and non-tariff barriers, are also scheduled to be eliminated under the
agreement.
AFTA is a significant agreement for ASEAN. I argue that the underlying
motivation for AFTA can be traced back to broader transformations in the international
^The fifteen sectors are: vegetable oils, cement, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, rubber products,
leather products, pulp, textiles, ceramic and glass products, gems and jewelry, copper cathodes,
electronics, wooden and rattan furniture.
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economic system, specifically the rise of economic regionalism as an organizing feature
in world trade. After examining the forces that led to the agreement, the factors
working in favor and against the agreement's implementation will be reviewed.
Explaining the Emergence of AFTA
The rise of economic blocs in Europe and North America produced a sea-change
in the attitudes of ASEAN countries towards regional integration. As recently as 1987,
the leaders of ASEAN considered and then rejected a proposal to form a free trade
area. Had the international economic system remained unaltered from 1987, it is
highly unlikely that ASEAN would have decided to pursue regional economic
cooperation. The reactive nature of ASEAN was highlighted by the region's leaders, as
Prime Minister Goh of Singapore contended that "if we don't synergize our strengths,
ASEAN will risk missing the boat. We will be stranded as we watch others sail by."2
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia noted how the "creation of powerful economic
groupings to advance regional interests have become a reality of international
economic life." President Suharto of Indonesia warned that economic regionalism "will
have negative effects on the developing countries if it is followed by the establishment
of groups among countries and eventually leads to closed and protectionist economic
blocs."
The leaders of ASEAN felt threatened by the EC and NAFTA for five principal
reasons: 1) they were concerned about trade diversion, 2) multi-lateral trade
organizations, notably the GATT, were weak at this time, 3) they feared foreign
investment would be diverted from ASEAN, 4) they thought they would be unable to
negotiate with such powerful groupings, 5) they were apprehensive that their
international competitiveness would be reduced. Each of these factors is detailed
below.
2Asian Wall Street Tournal. January 28, 1992, p. 1
STEPHEN G. BROOKS
Trade Diversion
An obvious fear among ASEAN is that the EC and NAFTA will become
increasingly insular and will set up strict barriers to the import of goods from outside
each economic bloc. As Table 1 indicates, ASEAN countries are particularly worried
about being shut out of Europe and North American markets because their
development strategies are been based largely around exports to these to two markets.






Importer 1988 1988 1988 1988 1987
US 16.0% 17.4% 29.6% 21.4% 16.7% 19.7%
Japan 41.7% 16.9% 16.2% 7.7% 13.4% 17.1%
EC 11.2% 14.5% 14.2% 11.6% 19.9% 13.3%
Source: Calculated using data from United Nations. Commodirv Trade Statistics.
The EC has already established a common external tariff, and NAFTA will not
have one, so ASEAN does not need to fear that its goods will face higher tariffs in these
two economic blocs. Nevertheless, ASEAN exports to both Europe and North America
could be reduced as a result of trade diversion, where trade shifts to within the bloc,
replacing goods that were formerly imported from outside the bloc. Trade diversion
occurs because there are no restrictions on intra-bloc trade while goods from outside
the bloc still face tariffs and other trade barriers.
The greatest fear of ASEAN countries is that their exports into Canada and the
United States will be replaced by goods from Mexico, since it has very similar factor
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endowments to Southeast Asia.3 Trade diversion will, of course, occur in Europe as
well, since Portugal, Greece and to a lesser extent Spain, could play the same role as
Mexico will in NAFTA, that of being a low cost producer of commodity goods. The
wages in these countries are not nearly as low as in Mexico, however, so ASEAN has
less to worry about trade diversion with regards to Europe than North America.
In addition to trade diversion, ASEAN is also worried that the coalescing of the
EC and NAFTA will lead to an increase in non-tariff barriers. Technical and
environmental standards, even if they are not designed to discriminate against
producers from outside the bloc, will likely improve the competitiveness of companies
within the bloc. ASEAN companies could be hard pressed if they are required to
substantially alter their production processes in order to comply with new regional
standards.
ASEAN countries are also afraid of the psychological effects of integration. Lim
Boon Heng, Singapore's senior minister of state for trade and industry, stated that
"although both the single European market and NAFTA are claimed to be non-
protectionistic, they will cause their businessmen to look inward."4 Because of
increased regional consciousness, it is likely that companies, as well as consumers, will
become accustomed to searching for suppliers within the bloc to supply their
demands.
While ASEAN exports to Europe and North America may be reduced by trade
diversion, the creation of AFTA could have the same effect on goods that ASEAN is
currently importing. Loss of employment in export sectors to the EC and North
America could be offset by an increase in goods produced within AFTA. As Table 2 on
page 12 indicates, only 15.5% of the goods that are included in the agreement are
currently imported from other members of ASEAN. As a result of AFTA, a substantial
percentage of the $76 billion of goods that are currently imported from outside ASEAN
might eventually be produced within the group, either by ASEAN companies or
MNCs from the rest of the world. As a result, there could be a substantial shift from
3The Financial Post [Bangkok], February 10, 1993, p. 13.
4Asian Wall Street Journal. August 14, 1992
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goods produced by foreign workers to goods that are produced by workers from one
of the countries in the bloc.
The leaders of ASEAN hope that trade creation within the region will offset any
losses of export markets in Europe and North America. Trade creation is extremely
beneficial, since the increased trade will be in products that are made by either new or
augmented industries within the bloc, which therefore means more employment.
There has been a tremendous amount of trade creation within the EC over the years, a
phenomenon which will likely be duplicated within NAFTA. The phenomenon of
trade creation in the other blocs is a process that ASEAN wishes to emulate through
the creation of its own trade bloc.
Multi-lateral Trade Organizations
The need for ASEAN to respond to the ascendance of NAFTA and the EC was
particularly acute because of the weakness of multilateral trade organizations at this
time. Most notably, ASEAN's faith in GATT was shattered because of the impasse in
the Uruguay round in December 1990. Asia has benefited probably more than any
other region of the world as a result of freer trade promoted through GATT. The
export-led development strategies of the ASEAN countries have only been possible
because of the relatively free flow of goods guaranteed by GATT. From ASEAN's
perspective, as well as the whole of Asia, it appeared that the vast bulk of the
developed world was abandoning its commitment to world-wide free trade in favor of
regional free trade. Far from offsetting the negative effects of economic regionalism,
GATT appeared to ASEAN to be yet another casualty of this trend.
A second organization ASEAN was unable to rely upon to protect its economic
interests was the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Formed in 1991, APEC is
a grouping of the United States, Canada, Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore,
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Australia and
New Zealand. APEC's purpose is to increase interdependence between Pacific
countries, discuss ways of promoting regional and world trade, and increase economic
growth in the region. APEC has ten different working groups: trade promotion,
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expansion of investment and technology transfers, human resource development,
regional energy cooperation, marine resource conservation, telecommunications,
transportation, data, tourism and fisheries.5
While the goals and actions of APEC are extremely beneficial to the promotion
of regional trade, the members of ASEAN did not see APEC as an adequate response to
the rise of trade blocs in Europe and North America. With or without APEC, members
of ASEAN felt that there would be a diversion of investment and trade from Asia to
these two new blocs. APEC would not be able to do anything to arrest the reduction in
international competitiveness of ASEAN exports as a result of the formation of these
two blocs. While APEC would be helpful when the group adopted a common position
when negotiating with the EC or countries outside of APEC, within APEC itself the
bargaining power of the ASEAN states would still be weak vis-a-vis the United States
or Japan. Thus, APEC was seen as a helpful but inadequate response to the new global
economic environment confronting ASEAN.
It was as a result of the breakdown of GATT negotiations, the rise of trade blocs
in Europe and North America, the inability of small Asian countries to negotiate with
such large economic entities as the EC, and the current inadequacy of APEC, that on
December 7, 1990, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia proposed the East Asian
Economic Grouping (EAEG). Mahathir envisioned the EAEG as a trade bloc which
would include Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia,
Brunei, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Indonesia. Mahathir maintained that if North
America and Europe turned inwards and put up protectionist walls against Asian
goods, that it would be necessary to find other markets for Asian goods. Mahathir saw
Asia itself as the most logical replacement of the European and North American
markets. Mahathir felt that the formation of a regional grouping would substantially
boost trade within the region, possibly to the point of offsetting any loss of markets
elsewhere in the world. Mahathir also felt that such a powerful and diversified
economic grouping would have a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the EC and
Sjames Baker, "America in Asia", Foreign Affairs : Winter 1991/92, p. 6
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NAFTA, whereas separately each Asian country, even Japan, would have difficulty
during negotiations with such powerful economies.
Mahathir envisioned Japan as the leader of this grouping. Because of Japan's
vast foreign investments in the region and because of its massive financial wealth, he
hoped that Tokyo would be able to play a role similar to Germany in the EC. With
Japan's extremely prosperous citizens, Japan would also be a key market for Asian
goods, hopefully reducing the region's reliance on the European and North American
markets.
Mahathir's plan was endorsed by several Asian governments, including
Singapore and Thailand within ASEAN. 6 However, the United States strongly
condemned the EAEG as an attempt to cut the United States off from Asia. Japan and
South Korea did not endorse the group out of fear of provoking the ire of the United
States. Among ASEAN, the strongest opposition to the EAEG came from Indonesia.
President Suharto disliked the confrontational tone of the EAEG and was afraid of
anything which might jeopardize his country's access to the massive American market.
Suharto also felt slighted by the fact that Indonesia was not consulted before Mahathir
announced his plan.7
In October 1991, at ASEAN's annual meeting of economic ministers, Mahathir
agreed to change the EAEG to the EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus). Although the
EAEG was originally envisaged as a trade bloc, Mahathir changed his conception of
the group's purpose to that of discussing regional trade issues with an aim to present a
common front in international negotiations. The change in name from the EAEG to the
EAEC underlined that the group was no longer intended to be a trade bloc. Mahathir
hoped that if the group was not seen as a trade bloc, the apprehensions of the US
would be assuaged and Japan and South Korea would be able to endorse the idea.
The US continued to object to the plan, however, even after the change to the
EAEC. Consequently, Japan and South Korea still demurred from joining the group.
Indonesia felt that it was inappropriate for ASEAN to endorse the EAEC. One
Indonesian ASEAN official argued that the EAEC "would look like an attempt to drive
6Asian Wall Street Journal. January 28, 1992, p. 1
' Asian Economic News [Kyodo], Jan. 20, 1992
ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 8
a wedge between Tokyo and Washington".8 In order to provide a framework for the
EAEC, the Indonesian government proposed that the group be merged with APEC.
Mahathir, however, already upset by having his original proposal changed to the
EAEC, was unwilling for it to be further diluted by having it be merged with APEC.9
The continued opposition to the EAEC among the major economies in Asia
ensures, despite continued lobbying by the Malaysian government, that there is little
chance that the agreement will proceed. While it is possible that Mahathir's proposal
may have proved to be a sufficient response to the rise of trade blocs in the
industrialized world, the ASEAN countries never got a chance to evaluate the efficacy
of his plan. The proposal's demise made it incumbent for ASEAN to act on its own in
order to guard against the negative repercussions of economic regionalism.
Foreign Investment
The diversion of foreign investment from ASEAN to other regions of the world
due to economic regionalism has been the most clearly expressed concern of ASEAN
leaders. According to Prime Minister Goh of Singapore, "unless ASEAN can match the
other regions in attractiveness both as a base for investments as well as a market for
their products, investments by multinational companies are likely to flow away from
our part of the world to Europe and NAFTA." Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of
Thailand stated that "the possible diversion of direct foreign investment to emerging
economic blocs.. .is a perpetual reminder that smaller countries have to unite to make
themselves attractive to foreign investment."10
Regional blocs are attractive to foreign investors because it is possible for a
multinational corporation (MNC) to set up a single production plant to serve all the
countries within the bloc. Manufacturers can then produce a large quantity in their
production facilities, thereby gaining the benefits of economies of scale and increasing
profits. Currently, high tariff rates within ASEAN make it difficult for MNCs to set up
8Asian Economic News. Jan. 24, 1992
9Far East Economic Review February 6, p. 10
1 The Nation [Bangkok], January 30, 1992, p. Bl
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a single production plant to serve all the countries within ASEAN. Consequently,
ASEAN countries feared that MNCs would view the EC and NAFTA as far more
profitable places to invest, thereby draining potential sources of foreign investment
away from ASEAN. Jusuf Wanandi, of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Jakarta, stated that "if ASEAN wants to compete successfully for trade and
investment, it needs to show that ASEAN itself is a big enough market."11
Trade Negotiations
AFTA was also seen as necessary to be able to deal effectively with large
economic powers in trade negotiations. During the Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiations, many ASEAN countries felt relegated to the sidelines as major
international actors such as the United States and the EC dominated the negotiations.
Similarly, ASEAN countries felt disadvantaged when engaging in bilateral
negotiations with the EC and the United States. In particular, the actions of the United
States in the last few years, under the Super 301 provision of the Omnibus Trade Bill,
have occasionally been a major source of irritation for some members of ASEAN.
In order to have a stronger negotiating stance, some of the members of ASEAN
have felt that it would be necessary to present their positions collectively, as a group,
rather than as individual countries. President Suharto, in his opening statement at the
Singapore summit, maintained it is necessary to "enhance intra-ASEAN economic
cooperation to ensure that our role and interests are given greater attention." By
forming a regional grouping encompassing 330 million people, the members of AFTA
feel this will do much to redress the problem of being overlooked or bullied by the
major economies in the world. An example of AFTA's unified approach to
negotiations is that the group has "agreed to put up a united front to promote exports
of certain agricultural goods and negotiate with the group's trading partners on market
access amid the escalating protectionism worldwide."12 Another sign of the increased
nAsian Wall Street Tournal. January 24, 1992, p. 1
12Tne Nation. January 25 1992, p. Bl
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clout of AFTA is that the EC announced that it wished to have regular dialogue
meetings between the two blocs.13
Reduced International Competitiveness
The members of ASEAN felt that the creation of AFTA was imperative to
strengthen, or at least maintain, the region's international competitiveness. They are
afraid that the competitiveness of products from the EC and NAFTA will improve as a
result of intra-bloc competition. With no barriers to the transfer of goods within these
two blocs, companies which used to be protected by tariffs and other trade barriers will
now be forced to compete with other companies from within the entire bloc.
Consequently, only the most efficient producers in Europe and North America will
survive the intra-bloc competition, while inefficient companies will fall by the wayside.
Those companies that remain will in turn have a larger market share than they did
before, because they will take over the markets of the companies which were forced
out due to competition. As a result of having larger market share, the efficiency of
these companies will be further enhanced, because they will now be able to produce
utilizing economies of scale. AFTA was seen as the only possible way to compete with
these improved companies from Europe and North America.
^Bernama [Kuala Lumpur], January 25 1992.
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Factors Which Make AFTA Likely to Succeed
Product Coverage
ASEAN's previous attempt at increasing intra-regional trade, the Preferential
Trading Arrangement (PTA), was unsuccessful because the products that were
included in the agreement were either meaningless items that were not traded, or were
goods which already faced low tariff rates. Goods included in the PTA accounted for
only 5% of ASEAN's intra-regional trade. The most significant factor working in favor
of the implementation of AFTA is that the agreement has very broad product coverage.
In total, over 38,308 products are currently scheduled for tariff reductions,
encompassing 87% of ASEAN's total trade. As table 2 indicates, only 7% of ASEAN's
trade, namely services and unprocessed agricultural goods, were permanently
excluded from tariff reductions. An additional 3,839 items, accounting for 6% of
ASEAN's trade, were temporarily excluded from the agreement. However, this
temporary list will be reviewed after eight years, to determine whether these products
still warrant exclusion from the agreement.
Significantly, fifteen sectors of goods were selected for accelerated tariff
reductions under the CEPT. As Table 3 indicates, the amount of intra-regional trade in
these fifteen sectors accounts for 24.7% of ASEAN's total intra-regional trade. Thus,
even if AFTA were to go no further, a very large amount of trade will have been
liberalized. It was very important to create the perception, both within ASEAN and
outside, that the agreement was proceeding forward expeditiously. The sense of the
agreement's inevitability could be a powerful incentive for foreign investment and
could also increase the political resolve of ASEAN's leaders towards AFTA.
Product coverage was also immeasurably improved as a result of the "6 minus
X" provision in the Framework Agreement. In ASEAN's previous attempt at
increasing intra-regional trade, the Preferential Tariff Agreement (PTA), decisions
about which products to include in the agreement were made by consensus.
Consequently, if one country strenuously objected to a certain product being included
in the agreement, that one country could normally prevent all the other ASEAN
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countries from reaping the benefits of freer trade in that particular product. ASEAN's
leaders recognized that using consensus to determine which products were included in
the agreement was a severe hindrance to reducing barriers on intra-regional trade.
Consequently, under the "Six Minus X" provision, member states can opt out of
reducing tariffs on a particular product if they are not yet ready. However, in opting
out of reducing tariffs on that product, this will not preclude other countries from
lowering their tariffs on this product. The reduction in tariffs will apply to the six
countries in ASEAN minus any country or countries who do not wish to open up their
markets for that product.






















Goods Excluded from AFTA
93 623 26 205
549 839 762 1,428





ASEAN 1,304 3,105 796 7,804 1,988 14,997
Non-ASEAN 11,944 13,437 7,936 36,058 10,984 80,359
World 13,248 16,542 8,731 43,862 12,972 95,356
Source: Calculated uj>ing data from United Nations. Commoditv Trade Statistics,
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The main advantage of the "Six minus X" provision is that it will mitigate the
problems caused by different levels of development and competitiveness within
ASEAN. The Philippines will likely be the country which will be most hesitant to open
its markets, followed by Indonesia. While there is no way of ascertaining whether
these two countries will significantly defer the liberalization of their markets, their
decision will not affect the speed at which the other four countries, who want to
implement AFTA quickly, wish to open their markets.
TABLE 3: IMPORTS OF ACCELERATED CEPT GOODS
IMPORTER
Indonesi Malaysia Philip- Singa- Thailand ASEAN
a pines pore
Regional Supplier of 1988 1988 1988 1988 1987
Imports
ASEAN 476 495 209 2,116 403 3,700
Non-ASEAN 3,437 2,609 1,640 9,041 3,243 19,970
World 3,913 3,105 1,848 11,157 3,647 23,670
Source: Calculated iising data from United Nations. Commoditv Trade Statistics
Product coverage was also improved as a result of the decision to only allow for
exclusions at the sectoral level. 14 The previous ASEAN attempt at increasing intra-
regional trade, the PTA, foundered because exclusions from the agreement were done
on a product by product basis. Exclusions done in this way were very easy, as
countries could pin-point specific industries for protection. It will be much harder to
exclude at the sectoral level, each of which encompasses a large number of similar
goods, than to exclude at the specific good level.
14Straits Times [Singapore], January 29, 1992, p.2
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Commitment to Tariff Liberalization
A very important factor working in favor of AFTA is that most of the leaders of
ASEAN have committed themselves to tariff liberalization. Considering the fact that
most of their economies are based on exports, the ASEAN leaders know that they must
remain internationally competitive lest their country's prosperity be threatened. Even
in the absence of the rise of economic regionalism, the countries of ASEAN likely
would have felt inexorable pressure to lower their tariffs to ensure that their exports
remain globally competitive. It is significant that a number of countries were
proceeding with liberalization strategies even before AFTA. Former Prime Minister
Anand of Thailand pointed out that "most of us have been liberalizing our tariff and
import regimes. We are now better equipped then ever before to move towards a
higher plane of ASEAN economic cooperation." In June 1991, Indonesia dramatically
lowered its tariffs and barriers to foreign investment. 15 The average tariffs on goods
imported into Indonesia is now (20%). For the past few years, Malaysia has been
lowering its barriers to foreign goods, and now has an average tariff rate of only
(9%). 16 Thailand, which before AFTA had the highest tariff levels within ASEAN,
announced immediately after the Singapore summit that it would unilaterally reduce
tariffs faster than the agreement calls for. Thai tariffs on more than 1,000 ASEAN
goods were reduced to 30% on Feb. 16, 1993. 17 Singapore and Brunei do not need to
substantially reduce their tariffs to comply with AFTA, since they have de facto free
trade already. In fact, at the beginning of 1993, Singapore completely eliminated tariffs
on all ASEAN imported products, thereby fulfilling its commitment to AFTA fifteen
years ahead of schedule. 18 The Philippines is the clear laggard in terms of tariff
reduction. Before AFTA they had the second highest tariff levels within ASEAN, and
there is no sign that they wish to engage in dramatic reductions in the near future.
*5 Far East Economic Review. June 13, 1991, pp. 73-4
16The Nation. January 22, 1992, ppAl,A2
17Business Times [Singapore], January 1, 1993
18Straits Times. January 1, 1993, p. 47
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With the other countries heading towards liberalization, however, there may be
increased pressure for the Philippines to open its markets.
Potential Stumbling Blocks To AFTA
Short Term Political Pain
The most obvious hindrance to AFTA is the fact that its implementation will
engender short term political pain. While the vast majority of people in a country
benefit by having open markets, the net gain that they derive is small in comparison to
the intense pain that is felt by workers who lose their jobs as a result of foreign
competition. The countries which will likely be most negatively affected by the
opening up of markets are Indonesia and the Philippines, as their domestic industries
are more protected and less competitive compared to those in Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia.
Because of the negative short-run repercussions of AFTA, many analysts view
political resolve as the key area of concern for the agreement. Sukhumbhand Paribatra,
director of Institute of Security and International Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn
University, stated that "the real test is later on—whether the substance of the
agreements comes through. ASEAN still needs the political will of its leaders to push
this ahead."19 For the moment, the prospects look favorable that the leaders of AFTA
will continue to display the necessary political will for the agreement to be fully
implemented.
However, it is much more difficult to initiate and support free trade during
periods of low economic growth. Whether ASEAN can maintain the spectacular rates
of growth that were achieved in the second half of the 1980s is not certain. Should the
19Asian Wall Street Journal. January 24, 1992, p. 1
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region's growth rates be at a reduced rate in the future, then it is likely that the leaders
will be more responsive the protectionist demands of those who will be hurt by AFTA.
Loophole/ Product Exclusion
Growing directly out of the problem caused by short term political pain is the
question of product exclusion. Mohammed Ariff correctly asserted that "much will
depend on the exemption list, which is antithetical to the whole AFTA concept."20
Under the CEPT, members are allowed to keep tariffs at their current levels on
products whose importation causes or threatens to cause "serious injury" to domestic
industries. A significant deficiency of the agreement is that there is no definition as to
what constitutes "serious injury". In addition, allowing countries to forego tariff
reductions on items merely where they fear "serious injury" is also a major problem,
since exemptions would be extremely easy to justify. Furthermore, there is no limit to
the number of products that countries can unilaterally exclude in this manner. The
Malaysian government has supposedly compiled a list of thousands of products that
firms in Malaysia wish to be excluded from AFTA. In an extreme reaction, a Filipino
commission studying AFTA has recommended that the Manila government reverse the
exclusion process, by listing products to be included in AFTA rather than outlining
products to be excluded from the agreement.21
A key question will be whether countries will be allowed to keep tariffs on
products which cause "serious injury" indefinitely, or whether it will be a temporary
exclusion which will merely give extra time for readjustment of extremely sensitive
industries. Once exclusions have been established, there will be tremendous political
pressure for them to be maintained. If ASEAN does not take a very firm stance on the
question of exclusions, then the agreement will not progress expeditiously.
20 Far East Economir Rpvjpw February 6, p. 10
21Inter Press Service [Manila], July 20, 1992
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Long Lead Time
An attempt to mitigate the problems caused by short term political pain has
been to stretch the implementation of AFTA over 15 years, to give adequate time for
inefficient industries to adjust to increased regional competition. However, the long
lead time is a significant problem with the agreement.
The agreement, as proposed by Thailand, was originally supposed to be
adopted over ten years. At one point, the Thai government actually broached the idea
of a five year adoption period.22 The idea of a ten year adoption period was strongly
supported by the Malaysian, Singapore and Brunei governments.23 Singapore and
Brunei were both largely supportive of the concept because they already have low or
virtually no tariffs on most goods.
Indonesia, however, raised strong objections to such a rapid pace. Having the
largest market of any ASEAN country, and because many of its industries are not as
developed as in other ASEAN countries, Indonesia argued that it would need a longer
time to adjust to a free trade area. Although Indonesia raised the strongest objection,
the Philippines also felt very uncomfortable with the 10 year time frame because its
industries are also not as developed as the rest of ASEAN. Leaders of other countries
were sensitive to the concerns of Indonesia, and a proposal put forth by Indonesia for a
15 year implementation period was adopted.24
While the 15 year time frame may be beneficial internally within ASEAN, it will
likely dilute the impact of AFTA as a means of attracting foreign investment. Former
Prime Minister Anand stated that "I initially proposed 10 years because I felt that
period would have a stronger impact on both ASEAN based and foreign investors...so
that they have confidence in us. Looking back on the past history of ASEAN, we have
not succeeded much in terms of economic cooperation. We want the AFTA to change
that. But it will take some time before foreign investors can accurately assess the
22Antara [Jakarta], January 21, 1992.
23The Nation. January 25, 1992, p. Bl
24Antara. January 21, 1992.
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situation and market potential here."25 If the long lead time causes the agreement to
fall short of its foreign investment goals, then support for the agreement itself may
become more tenuous among ASEAN's leaders.
As a result of concern over the length of the adoption period, the six foreign
ministers of ASEAN agreed in July that AFTA should be achieved earlier than the 15-
year time frame.26 The ASEAN Chambers of Commerce have also held discussion on
speeding up the implementation of AFTA.27 However, no mechanisms were adopted
to achieve that end.
Regional Security Tensions
Within Europe and North America there are no territorial disputes, the member
countries do not look askance at each other's military capabilities, and there is little
concern about intra-regional security. All the security threats to the countries within
NAFTA and the EC lie outside of those economic alliances, rather than within each
bloc. In marked contrast, the countries of ASEAN have not yet resolved their intra-
regional security concerns. While ASEAN countries are not hostile towards each other,
their relationships are certainly not as free of security suspicions as within the EC or
NAFTA.
Just before the Singapore summit, Thailand and Malaysia engaged in talks
regarding their borders. The problem between the two countries occurred because
uniformed Thai soldiers entered into Malaysian territory once in July 1990 and four
times in December 1990. The reason for entering into Malaysia was purportedly to
stamp out smuggling. After the talks between the two countries, Mahathir released a
statement that "Thailand has agreed that it will not resort to provocative acts and will
have discussions with Malaysia on any problem relating to territory."28 Mahathir also
held discussions with Suharto over borders, specifically over the Sipadan and Ligitan
25The Nation. January 30, 1992, p. B2.
26Straits Times. July 21, 1992
27Straits Times. January 7, 1993, p. 36
28Bernama. January 26, 1992.
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Islands that Indonesia claims. Malaysia and Singapore are currently contesting
sovereignty over Pedra Branca islands.29 A serious point of dispute within ASEAN is
the Spratly islands, an area with potentially rich deposits of oil and gas claimed wholly
or in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
Discussions over the Spratlys dominated the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting last
July.30 In addition, there are dangers as a result of the different approaches towards
Cambodia taken by Thailand and Indonesia. While none of these disputes threatens to
lead to hostilities, their presence in an indication of the suspicious attitude that
ASEAN's members have towards each other. Significantly, defense budgets within the
region are rising at a very rapid pace.
More significantly, even if there are no pressing security problems within
ASEAN itself, there most certainly are a number of potential destabilizing disturbances
in the Asia Pacific region which would have deleterious effects upon ASEAN. The
combined effect of the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of US forces from the
Philippines and the stated intention of the United States to reduce its forces in the
region has accentuated fears within Asia that previously latent disputes may flare up
again. Some in Asia fear that Tokyo will eventually feel that they need to fill the
region's "security vacuum". Still other countries fear not only that Japan might come to
have a much larger security role in the region, but in addition that China or India
might begin to seek a larger military presence. Other problems in Asia not as related to
the withdrawal of US forces include tensions between North and South Korea. The
possibility of implosion within China must always be viewed with great caution.
Russia, although focused inward for the foreseeable future, may have the capacity to
use its vast military resources in Asia and should always be taken into account.
While none of these threats poses an imminent danger to the security of
ASEAN, the great uncertainty in Asia's present security environment led many within
ASEAN to call on the group to assume a new security role. Despite the seeming need
for ASEAN to develop a way of dealing with regional security issues, there is serious
disagreement among the group over which direction to proceed. The danger is that
29International Defense Review. August 1992, p.732
3 Straits Times. September 9, 1992
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the inability of ASEAN to craft a consensus on forging a new security role for itself will
result in greater instability in the region, and will make it very difficult for the group to
respond to any possible disturbances. ASEAN's past economic success were greatly
dependent on the stability of the region, and that the success of AFTA in the future^will
be dependent upon continued harmony both within ASEAN itself and between the
major powers in the region.
Omissions From the Agreement
There are a number of mechanisms and procedures that are crucial to the
formation of a free trade area which are not included in the AFTA agreement. The
agreement is specific as to the goals of the treaty, but it is often vague or incomplete as
to the means to achieve those goals.
A major shortcoming with AFTA is that there is no fixed schedule of tariff
reductions. In marked contrast to NAFTA, where countries have a number of targets
which they must meet by specific deadlines, ASEAN countries are free to set their own
tariff reduction program.31 Because the tariff deadlines within AFTA are so far in the
future, there is great danger that countries will delay reductions, possibly to the point
where it becomes impossible for them to comply with the agreement. The risk that
countries will fail to reduce tariffs enough is particularly strong because there is no
supra-national authority with binding power. While the ministerial-level Council is
responsible for monitoring whether countries are complying with the agreement's
terms, it does not have any powers of enforcement. This is in marked contrast to the
provisions in NAFTA, where any delays in implementation leads to the setting up of a
panel which deals with the problem. According to Prof. Richard Lipsey, AFTAs lack of
enforcement means "there would seem to be little to prevent individual ASEAN
countries from delaying tariff cuts if they chose to."32
Another deficiency with AFTA is that there are no provisions for the
coordination of external policy. Most notably, the agreement does nothing to establish
31Straits Times. January 13, 1993, p. 36
^Business Times. January 13, 1993, p. 3
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a common stance regarding the treatment of foreign investment. As a result, MNCs
will set up in those countries that have the most advantageous laws rather than
according to the basis of which country would be most valuable from a production
standpoint to locate in. Countries will therefore compete against each other in order to
attract foreign investment, which will reduce the benefits accrued from MNCs.
In addition, AFTA does not establish common standards on subsidies or
government procurement. Consequently, more efficient industries in one country will
often be at a comparative disadvantage with less efficient industries in another country
which receive substantial governmental assistance. Such policies will cause the
distribution of benefits from AFTA to be less equitable, reduce the group's
international competitiveness, and cause a drain on public resources in those countries
which engage in significant subsidization.
A significant weakness with AFTA is that there is no specific provision designed
to reduce non-tariff barriers. As a result, even if countries are successful in reducing
regional tariffs, the gains of trade creation may prove elusive if there is an increase in
the importance of less formal barriers to trade. Product standards are the most
important kind of NTB which AFTA must deal with. Without common health, safety
and other standards, then trade flows within ASEAN could be greatly disrupted.
AFTA did establish a 40% level of local content that a product will have to have
in order to qualify for tariff reductions. However, the agreement does nothing to
ensure that countries use the same procedures in determining what qualifies as local
content. There are numerous possible discrepancies, such as whether or not to count
managerial labor, which could lead to substantial variation between countries.
The approach to the drafting of AFTA was vastly different from that which is
taken by industrialized countries, where the specific details of free trade agreements
are worked out in advance of the ratification of the treaty. AFTA is a political
document, in that the text of the treaty was rushed in order to coincide with the
Singapore summit. Had the countries party to the agreement wanted the treaty to be
economically precise, then it would have taken many more months for the text to be
negotiated. It is possible that many of the omissions from AFTA were not made out of
ignorance, but that the framers of the agreement instead recognized the need for these
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provisions but knew that they would be unable to complete these details before the
Singapore summit. Many of these procedures, especially the rules of origin, are
extremely complicated. So long as these deficiencies are recognized within ASEAN,
and are dealt with, then the eventual success of AFTA will not be greatly diminished.
If, however, there is a lack of recognition of these shortcomings, or if they are
recognized but there does not exist the political will to implement solutions, then
AFTA's progress will be severely hampered. The lack of action on these problems in
the period since AFTA's inception is not an encouraging sign that they will be
adequately dealt with.
Uneven Levels of Development
One of the major obstacles to AFTA is that the countries within ASEAN are at
different stages of economic development. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have
grown rapidly in the last decade, and now have the ability to manufacture a wide
range of goods which are very competitive internationally. Brunei has not yet
experienced spectacular growth, but does not fear the effects of foreign competition
because of its high level of income from oil exports. Indonesia has grown rapidly in
the last few years as well, but its goods are not as competitive as in these first three
countries. The Philippines, in contrast to the rest of ASEAN, is economically stagnant
and its industries are very uncompetitive.
Because of differences in development and competitiveness, there is great
disparity within ASEAN on the question of economic liberalization. Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei are all in favor of quick implementation of AFTA.
Singapore and Brunei have everything to gain from AFTA, since their markets are
already predominantly open. Malaysia is eager for AFTA because its industries are
competitive. As Table 4 indicates, Malaysia already sends 24% of its exports to ASEAN
countries, a number which it hopes can grow even larger. Next to Singapore, Thailand
has probably the most competitive goods within ASEAN, and therefore feels that it has
nothing to fear and much to gain as a result of lower tariffs within ASEAN.
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TABLE 4: Percentage Distribution of Exports of ASEAN Countries





IMPORTER 1988 1988 1988 1988 1987
Brunei 0.3% 0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.5%
Indonesia 1.3% 0.3% 3.8% 0.5% 1.9%
Malaysia 1.0% 1.3% 12.2% 3.0% 5.7%
Philippines 0.4% 1.5% 1.2% 0.5% 0.9%
Singapore 8.6% 19.3% 2.3% 8.0% 6.6%
Thailand 0.8% 2.0% 1.4% 4.9% 2.7%
ASEAN Total 10.8% 24.4% 5.3% 22.9% 12.1% 18.3%
Source: Author's calculations using data from United Nations. Commodity Trade
Statistics.
In contrast to these first four countries, Indonesia is fearful of AFTA, and was
the main force in lengthening the implementation of the agreement from 10 to 15 years.
Indonesia, with by far the largest market in the group, was afraid that it would be
deluged by imports from other ASEAN countries which were more economically
advanced. Indonesia's recent economic growth has been based on exports, but not to
other countries within ASEAN. Indonesia sends only 10.8% of its exports to other
ASEAN countries, which is the second lowest percentage in the group. As a result,
Indonesia feels that they have much to lose by AFTA, and pushed for the adoption of
the clause which allows countries to stop tariff liberalization of products whose
importation causes "serious injury" to domestic industries. Still, the Indonesian
government recognizes that tariff liberalization will be beneficial in the long run, and
President Suharto has strongly endorsed AFTA.
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The Philippines has even greater concerns about AFTA than Indonesia. The
Filipino economy is by far the weakest in the group, and its goods are the least
competitive. Protected behind very high tariffs, many Filipino industries have become
very bloated. The Philippines exports only 5.3% of its exports to ASEAN countries, by
far the lowest percentage of any ASEAN country. Like Indonesia, it fears that its
inefficient domestic industries will be overwhelmed by foreign competition. Because
its politics are far less stable than in Indonesia, it is likely that the Filipino government
will respond to the political pressure from industries which will suffer as a result of
lower tariffs. Consequently, the Philippines will probably be the country which exerts
the most braking power on AFTA.
Conclusion
AFTA was formed as a reaction to a world economic environment that was
completely different from that which existed in the past. Previously, when the world
trading system was based around the promotion of freer, multi-lateral trade through
the GAIT, trade blocs were evaluated according to a totally different standard than
they are today. According to the old criteria for evaluating the efficacy of a trade bloc,
AFTA would appear unlikely to succeed. The fact that ASEAN has largely competitive
rather than complementary economies, that these economies are at different levels of
development, that regional economic integration is quite low, and that there are
unresolved regional security and political tensions would lead one to conclude that an
ASEAN trade pact would not be appropriate. It was because of these factors that, in
1987, ASEAN in fact rejected the idea of forming a free trade pact.
Since 1987, however, the economic environment outside of ASEAN has changed
immensely. In 1987, the goal of European economic integration still seemed
unattainable, there was not yet a free trade agreement between the United States and
Canada, US-Mexico free-trade was not even a policy proposal, and GATT's foundation
seemed very solid. At this time, therefore, there was no external justification for the
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creation of an ASEAN free trade pact. With the dramatic transformation in emphasis
from multi-lateralism to economic regionalism, however, a powerful external rationale
for an ASEAN free trade pact was created. ASEAN is perhaps more threatened than
any other region in the world by the creation of trade blocs in Europe and North
America and by the breakdown of GATT negotiations.
AFTA became the means by which the members of ASEAN could promote their
own national interests. The need of countries to protect their strategies of export-led
growth outweighed the original resistance to the agreement expressed in 1987. The
factors which precluded an agreement in 1987, however, still exist today and will be
formidable obstacles to the implementation of AFTA. But these factors are currently
regarded within ASEAN as being less threatening than the prospect of not responding
to the EC, NAFTA, and the vitiation of GAIT.
There is no way of knowing whether the obstacles that precluded a trade pact in
1987 will continue to be less important than the need to respond to economic
regionalism. For the foreseeable future, the assertive public stands made by ASEAN's
leaders in favor of the agreement as being crucial to the continued prosperity of
ASEAN will continue to belie the negative political and economic prospects of AFTA's
implementation. Now that the process of tariff liberalization has begun, enough
momentum may have been created that the agreement will move forward. However,
it appears that ASEAN is still assessing the international environment in order to
gauge whether or not AFTA is truly necessary. For the moment, ASEAN's exports
have still not been negatively affected by economic regionalism. Because the
agreement's implementation period is so extended and many of the difficult political
decisions have been delayed into the future, it is evident that AFTA was expressly set
up as an insurance policy against a further worsening of the global trade environment.
If the world economic environment continues to deteriorate, then the group will be in a
position to move forward. However, should the global economic environment become
less threatening, either through the re-invigoration of GATT or if the regional trade
blocs in North America and Europe prove to not be as trade diverting as they are
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